My colleague Adrian Bardon has recently argued that, given the human experience of evil in the world and God’s apparent inability to stop or prevent evil, God or a morally perfect God does not exist. His argument begins with common divine attributes: “omnipotent,” “omniscient” and “morally perfect” to refer to God’s nature. The basic line of this argument is that if God possesses these attributes, God must be able to stop or prevent all evil because the existence of evil is contrary to God’s nature so characterized.

In reply, I want to clarify just a few things. First, many philosophers argue that it is not the existence of evil that is the problem but the existence of gratuitous evil — i.e. the evil that is not counterbalanced, if it exists at all.

For it is logically possible that some evils are counterbalanced in different ways in which the negative value of the evils is outweighed or defeated by the existence of a greater good in this world or another world.

Suppose that such a counterbalancing of evil is possible.

It then should be clear that we humans do not have a formula, much less a perfect one, for determining the overall comparative value of good and evil involved in a seemingly complex state of affairs.

Perhaps we should remember that sometimes an adversity, whether in society or in science, brings out the best of human solidarity and creativity.

Second, even if there is gratuitous evil in this world, it does not follow that God’s existence is incompatible with that of gratuitous evil. It is neither necessary nor reasonable to believe that an omnipotent and benevolent God should not or would not have created a world other than a naturally and morally perfect world, if the end of creation is something other than the human experience of perfection.

Not only may the definition or the criteria of perfection differ among human beings as well as between human beings and God, but there is also no compelling reason why the human experience of perfection should be the end of creation. We may ask, for instance, how Bardon would define perfection and explain its necessary conditions. Is natural immortality, if this is possible, a necessary element of a perfect world? Is the incapacity to experience both physical and mental pain a necessary condition of a perfect world?

After all, if we were to follow the logic of his argument, God could certainly have created a perfect world in which no one has to experience pain and death of any kind, not just the ones that Bardon mentions.

But wait a minute. What about many forms of arts and literature whose beauty and meaning are dependent upon concepts and emotions derived from such experience? Would the world without arts and literature really be a perfect world? Thus, back to my main point: Whose idea of perfection? Which criteria of perfection?

Third, Bardon’s critique of (the lack of) divine agency in the world seems to suggest that we should welcome divine interference with our freedom in every aspect of our life whenever we are about to do a serious wrong. But it is not clear to me why this should be called true freedom.

Would we not resent being controlled in that way? Does not his view of divine agency amount to a kind of divine manipulation or dictatorship? I personally do not think that the best form of parenting is to give our children everything they need and to follow every step of their way lest they err. On a more serious note, Bardon will need to show the kind of connection between indeterminism and a morally perfect world.

Fourth, Bardon’s overall argument is premised in a strongly anthropocentric ethic — i.e., an ethic in which the standards and the authority of moral evaluation belong solely to human beings. Insofar as I can see, the assumption that we human beings are the measure of all value is just as theological as the opposite view that God is the measure. As such, his assumption is neither scientific nor epistemically justified. It is not empirically verifiable that moral evaluation is a solely human affair. Nor is it more reasonable to believe that human beings, not God, should be the measure of all value, since it would be hard to generate and justify proper epistemic criteria for answering this question without running into a circular argument.

Kevin Jung is an assistant professor of Christian ethics in the Divinity School.